__________________________________


​​1º classificado
​no Prémio Res Publica 2022

​__________________________________​

CARLA VALADAS
​​é Doutorada em Sociologia pela Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra. Atualmente, é Professora Adjunta na Escola Superior de Educação e Ciências Sociais do Politécnico de Leiria e Investigadora Integrada no CEIS20 da Universidade de Coimbra. Participou em vários projetos nacionais e europeus, publicando amplamente em livros e artigos com revisão científica. Os seus interesses de investigação incluem políticas sociais e de emprego, os regimes de Estado-Providência, as transformações do mercado de trabalho em Portugal e no Sul da Europa, bem como os significados e impactos da ativação das políticas de emprego e da precariedade laboral em grupos sociais específicos. Ao longo do seu percurso académico, tem aprofundado de forma consistente o processo de construção da União Europeia, área de investigação pela qual demonstra particular interesse científico.
________________________________

EUROPEAN SOCIAL UNION
IN TIMES OF DYSTOPIA.
THE LONG (SOCIAL) WALK
OF SOUTHERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
Carla Valadas

The well-known statement by Jean Monnet, one of the European Union (EU) architects, that “Europe will be forged in crisis” (Monnet 2015), seems more contemporary than ever. At the beginning of 2020, a ubiquitous virus spread across the world, challenging the policies of both the EU and its member-states. It soon became evident that it was necessary not only to address unknown and largely wide health effects, but also to contain broader and unexpected social and economic risks. The unprecedented impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on societies and individuals, together with the expected deterioration of the social situation – particularly concerning unemployment, poverty and inequalities – called for more robust social protection, especially at the EU level. Drawing on a literature review and an analysis of secondary statistical data, this essay examines the extent to which EU institutions’ response to the pandemic incorporated a kind of new “social wave”, even as the marked differences among EU welfare states were (further) exposed.

A first research question can be formulated as follows: does the specific set of policy measures devised to help member states mitigate the effects of the pandemic represent a steppingstone toward building a more “European Social Union” (Vandenbroucke 2013, Vandenbroucke and Vanhercke 2014)? Among the previous initiatives that aimed to bring social issues onto the EU political agenda (Ferrera 2018, 2019) sits the institutional proclamation, in November 2017, of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) at the EU Social Summit in Gothenburg. Though there are different perspectives on the potential of the EPSR to reinvigorate EU social policy (Deakin 2017, Vanhercke et al. 2018), it is reasonable to argue that the EPSR introduced a new rhythm and a renewed willingness to implement updated social instruments at the EU level (De la Porte and Madama 2022).

The second research question acknowledges that the EU’s internal imbalances are particularly evident in countries characterised by sharp social divides, vulnerable financial conditions (notably high debt), and a wider gap from EU social standards compared with stronger welfare regimes. We argue that Southern European societies - such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece - constitute a noteworthy laboratory for analysing the influence and effects of EU social policy on citizens’ living and working conditions. The recent trajectory of these countries also provides a valuable basis for discussing how a scenario of multiple, successive crises demonstrates that the EU’s idealised unity has still a long way to go.

For Southern European countries, integration into the EU is highly relevant and, in general, they display a trajectory of formal compliance with EU law and with inclusive principles of solidarity and equality (Portugal being a paradigmatic example). However, their implementation performance has not, so far, resulted in a convergence toward the living and working conditions of the “best performers”.

A preliminary conclusion is that the structural imbalances, persisting social inequalities, and comparatively weak welfare systems continue in Southern European countries to constrain these countries’ capacity to promote more equitable growth and to build resilient societies. A second, equally preliminary, idea is that although the EU produced a swift response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the window of opportunity it created may have been open only briefly.

TAKING EU POLITICAL WILLING FURTHER
IN THE WAKE OF A GLOBAL PANDEMIC

The capacity of EU social policy to compensate for the mistakes of economic competence and upward social convergence, was still being tested - guided by the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) principles and instruments (Valadas 2021) - , when an unexpected pandemic caused by COVID-19 exposed new and pressing societal challenges. As the health crisis spread across the world in early 2020, massive (un)employment effects and deepening social divides became evident (Ladi and Tsarouhas 2020, Moreira and Hick 2021).

At one point, most EU member states faced a significant decline in their economic activity, with some sectors – such as tourism, building and construction, automotive/motor-vehicle production, personal services, artistic activities, accommodation, and food services - being severely affected by lockdown measures implemented to halt the spread of the virus (Myant 2021). Despite the virus ‘s common features, its impacts varied considerably across countries and regions (Dodds et al. 2020, Béland et al. 2021), as well as among different social groups depending on factors such as qualification levels, age, or gender (Aubert et al. 2022). This means that the social and economic effects of the pandemic were not experienced simultaneously nor with equal intensity across all contexts.

The literature shows that welfare systems were not equally prepared – nor equally able to implement the necessary adjustments - to protect their citizens from the effects of an unexpected phenomenon such as the Covid 19 pandemic. Drawing on a synthetic index of social resilience, Pereirinha and Pereira (2021) demonstrate that the capacity to cope and adapt to the pandemic varied according to the specific configuration of each welfare system. Béland et al. similarly emphasised that social policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic “reflect, at least in part, existing national policy legacies” (Béland et al. 2021: 249).

Another idea highlighted in the literature is that, unlike what occurred after the 2008-9 crisis, EU institutions responded swiftly to the Covid 19 pandemic (Ladi and Tsarouhas 2020). After the April peak 2020, the European Commission issued mechanisms to help member states support their healthcare systems and to foster collaboration in development vaccine (Ferrera et al. 2021). In addition, several instruments were deployed to assist Member States in minimising the impacts of the pandemic on workers, businesses, and society at large, ranging from “macro-economic stimulus interventions to measures to help sustain employment, incomes and the economy” (Baptista et al. 2021: 10). A set of distinct yet complementary instruments was designed, including short-time schemes and a longer-term recovery plan, Next Generation EU (NGEU). NGEU was launched with the aim of promoting an investment-rich recovery and growth-enhancing reforms by providing €338 billion in non-repayable support and up to €385.8 billion in loans (at current prices) over the period up to 2026 (Eurofound 2022). This constituted the largest stimulus package ever financed in the EU and marked a break “with core norms of EU cooperation” (de la Porte and Jensen 2021: 389).

Among the short-term schemes was the Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE). SURE was a pivotal mechanism that helped Member States finance short-time work without conditions. Its primary aim was to protect workers (employees and self-employed individuals) against the risk of unemployment and income loss for a certain period (Baptista et al. 2021). An Emergency Support Instrument was also created to help mitigate some of the pandemic immediate consequences and to anticipate needs related to the recovery. In addition, increased flexibility in the use of Cohesion funds was agreed through the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus. Short-time work schemes were introduced alongside unemployment benefit schemes, for example, and contributed significantly to stabilising employment and workers’ income[1].

As for the NGEU package, Armingeon et al. question whether “it could mark a critical juncture in the development of the EU towards a stronger redistributive function” and represent a “fresh start”, even if still haunted by the recent past (Armingeon et al. 2022: 144). Although it was rapidly designed, as time passed and the instruments began to be implemented, it became increasingly evident that some of the potential and innovative features of NGEU were less compelling and less unequivocal than initially anticipated (de la Porte and Jensen 2021). Shortcomings – such as the overall size of the financial package and its distributive basis, the liability associated with a joint debt, and the genuine possibility to address structural weaknesses and gaps - became salient (Armingeon et al. 2022: 148).

The Recovery and Resilience Facility[2], a key instrument at the core of NGEU, soon exposed the EU’s internal diversity. This diversity has always been difficult to manage, but it appears even more challenging at a time when the risk of social and economic divergence is increasing, reflecting - among other aspects -, the distinct models of welfare across Member States.

INEQUALITIES AMONG COUNTRIES
AND INDIVIDUALS IN FACE OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Southern EU societies such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain sit among EU countries where economic and social imbalances are noticeable, and levels of welfare generosity remain low (Petmesidou 2018). These four countries belong to the so called Southern European welfare regime[3] and share institutional and cultural traits that shape their social and economic policies. Weaknesses of state institutions – namely those linked to historically embedded differences in the functioning of public services -, high fragmentation and internal polarisation of income maintenance systems; a distinctive public/private mix and a clientelist political structure are some of the characteristics highlighted by authors like Rhodes (1996), Petmesidou (1996) and Ferrera (1996). Other shared features relate to deep and enduring social and economic inequalities that are difficult to break, as well as a strong reliance on family support to address several social and economic risks. Significant disparities among workers and individuals are most evident by the dualization between well protected and under protected groups. Although - as Moreira et al. (2015) have shown - the gap between the so-called “insiders” and the large and diverse number of “outsiders” narrowed following the austerity-oriented measures and welfare reforms introduced in response to the 2008-9 crisis, high levels of segmentation persist. Vulnerabilities in the labour market are linked to a persistent reliance on insecure and low-cost labour, combined with a low degree of protection and heightened income and job insecurity for workers in “non-standard” forms of employment (including fixed-term, agency, and platform workers) as well as the self-employed. Workers in these categories have limited access to social protection, notably in the domains of unemployment and sickness benefits, maternity/paternity leaves, schemes covering occupational diseases and accidents at work (Matsaganis et al. 2016). This happens, namely, because they work fewer hours, earn/declare lower earnings or to the fact that they do not fulfil eligibility conditions (due, for example, to age or not having worked for a certain period before claiming the benefit).

The literature shows that the economic contraction caused by the Covid-19 pandemic hit Southern EU countries hard (Moreira et al. 2020, Guillén et al. 2022, Suárez-Grimalt et al. 2022). Massive employment and unemployment effects were observed almost immediately after the introduction of lockdown measures designed to limit the potential scale of the crisis, and severe social divides between distinct groups of workers intensified. However, the more affected sectors and social groups were not necessarily the same than in previous crises (Eurofound 2020). First, the heavy reliance of Southern European countries on tourism (and related activities, such as hotels and restaurants) and travel (Jestl and Stehrer 2021, Myant 2021) heightened their exposure to the economic turbulence generated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, among the groups that suffered the most were workers in “essential jobs” unable to work remotely and faced higher risks of exposure to the virus – such as, among many others, hospital cleaning staff, and supermarkets cashiers. These workers tend to be low paid and low skilled and are often exposed to greater employment instability. Self-employed and individuals on fixed or short-term contracts were also heavily affected by the pandemic and the ensuing national lockdowns. Another group severely impacted by the health and economic crisis were individuals whose health status was already fragile, often because of poverty and low income (Bambra et al. 2020).
 
What is more, at least since the 2008-9 crisis (and despite differences between the four countries), Southern European governments have been confronted with a reduced margin of manoeuvre to increase and restructure their levels of social spending, as well as to delineate a solid trajectory of economic growth[4].
 
ACTORS PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE
IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND DYSTOPIA.
THE USE OF SHORT-TERM AND MEDIUM/LONG-TERM INITIATIVES

Alongside the initiatives implemented by the European Commission, Southern European governments – like many other EU member states – introduced measures to address employment shocks and rapidly growing income threats, in parallel with those aimed at containing the spread of the virus. The first phase of full-scale lockdown lasted from March until July 2020 and included the shut of nonessential retail shops, restaurants, and several other “non-essential” services. In response to the full closure of schools and childcare facilities, Southern European governments provided (limited time) support for parents taking care of their children. For some sectors and activities, it was possible to reconcile economic activity with health control by adopting remote work, teleworking, and adjusting working hours. This was, generally, the case of higher-paying industries whose workers were more likely to be able to work from home and be less exposed to an income shock. A considerable amount of research examines the precise nature and manifestation of specific measures implemented in Southern European countries (Moreira et al. 2021) as well as in specific countries within the group (Almeida and Santos 2020). Among similar initiatives to counterbalance the effects on employment and labour income of economic lockdown are initiatives such as: job retention policies (whether short-time work or other furlough schemes); support to mitigate unemployment risks; deferral of (part of) employers’ social security contributions; adjustment of eligibility rules regarding social benefits (such as unemployment allowances, minimum income, sickness benefit schemes). Paraphrasing Ebbinghaus and Lehner, job retention policies can be seen as “public programmes aimed at avoiding excessive job destruction during downturns” (Ebbinghaus and Lehner 2022: 48) that include direct transfers to the employees and/or financial compensation to the employers. Some of these programmes eventually contributed to attenuate the impacts of the pandemic on the labour market, by protecting jobs and containing more severe income falls, at least for some time. Consequently, there was no long-lasting increase in the unemployment rate after the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic (Eurofound 2022). However, as stressed by Moreira and Hick (2021) Southern European countries enduring economic and social vulnerabilities, not only make their “starting position” weaker as they represent an additional burden in exceptional circumstances.

Data from Eurostat shows that, in comparison with 2019, the total volume of worked hours in 2020 decreased by almost one-fifth in Greece (-19.7%), Spain (-19.5%), Portugal and Italy (-19.0% for both) (Eurofound 2022). There was also a reduction in the employment rate, with the highest declined observed in Spain (corresponding to 2,3 percentage points), and an increase in the unemployment rate (reaching double-digit rates of 16,3% in Greece and Spain) (Eurostat 2021). Southern European countries are also among the ones where there was a sharper decline in GDP.

A more detailed analysis of the groups whose employment situation became even more at risk, shows that women were more negatively impacted as they work in sectors more intensely affected by the shut-down, and more likely under non-standard contracts (Rubery and Tavora 2021). Young workers were also disproportionally affected by the Covid-19 pandemic and experienced more difficulties in terms of (un)employment (Eurofound 2022).

EU SOUTHERN COUNTRIES’ LONG STORY
OF ENDURING VULNERABILITIES

Southern European countries enduring social and economic/financial limits continue to be prominent. As explained above, one major limitation relates to long-term vulnerabilities of Southern European welfare systems, imbalanced distribution of resources and inefficient labour market institutions (Valadas 2022). For example, the institutional support for the unemployed, or individuals in search of a job, continues to be weak and coverage remains incipient, causing multidimensional consequences (social and psychological risks but also more or less pronounced financial deprivation), difficult to address. In this regard, a more coordinated plan anchored on complementary, multi-actors’ action, a medium-long term perspective and efficient and independent evaluation processes could be considered an asset.

The second shortcoming derives from additional financial constraints (high levels of debt, fall of GDP) aggravated by adverse circumstances linked namely to the Covid-19 pandemic, labour market ongoing megatrends (linked, namely, to digitalisation, shortening and greying of the workforce, diversification and precarisation of work patterns, climate change challenges) and, more recently, to the inflationary scenario and (increasing) food and energy pressure resulting (in part) from the War in Ukraine. In a time when new social and economic risks put additional pressure on welfare systems and labour markets, to resettle a trajectory of convergence within the EU landscape and implement (some of) the ambitious goals of EU to overcome the successive crises, former to and following the Covid-19 pandemic, sufficient and solid budgetary resources are necessary. For now, countries in Southern Europe seem to have very limited (political) options in this regard. These limits can be better contextualised if we take a closer look at some of the available instruments themselves.
 
PERSISTING ECONOMIC IMBALANCES/CONSTRAINS

Short-term work schemes and the recovery and resilience funds developed to help member states recuperate from the pandemic might, after all, contribute to maintain or eventually aggravate the position of less rich member states (and regions among them). This relates to the way social funds are distributed and used (De la Porte and Madama 2022). Southern European countries have more difficulties in what concerns co-funding, for example. Moreover, their capacity to invest both in the green economy (which is at the core of the recovery and resilience plans) and in social initiatives aimed at improving the situation of workers in the labour market or making considerable adjustments to ageing populations seems rather fragile. In fact, the two can be interrelated. Investing in skills and adequate (re)training, providing higher/decent wages, and extending social benefits to reach all workers independently of their employment status are all necessary to better equip workers and prepare companies to the transition to the green and digital economy. Southern European countries, however, continue to struggle, namely, with high levels of public debt and fragile economic stability. For countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain still recovering from the effects of the 2008-9 crisis and the austerity measures that followed, it seems especially difficult to reconcile economic and financial (hard) rules with social policy, even if anchored in indicators, such as the ones established in the EPSR social scoreboard[5]. The ability to respond to ongoing challenges, linked to growing inequalities, demographic dynamics as well as to stringent technological transformations is crucial. Leading with the impacts of digitalization, equipping the workforce for future jobs and (re)adjusting work content remains at the centre of the political debate. These countries’ recent experience shows that much has still to be achieved in terms of (social) investment, particularly, in terms of providing adequate skills and vocational training[6] for all workers.
 
CONCLUSION

The Covid-19 pandemic, as it happened after the onset of the 2007-8 crisis, exposed enduring weaknesses in member states and welfare state regimes in the areas of work and welfare. Similarly to what can be perceived among vulnerable social groups (Béland et al. 2022), the hardest hit in the pandemic are countries that were already in a weaker condition before the crisis. Focusing on the recent experience of Southern EU member states and how it intersects the goal of making the EU move into a more “social direction” in disturbing times, it seems that imbalances within the EU have not been attenuated. On the contrary, the effects of recent crises accentuated gaps between and within countries. What can be achieved at the EU level continues to be considerably endangered, despite the quick response by EU institutions (triggered by the European Commission initiative) in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic and the potentialities and promises linked to recent initiatives aiming to bring a more solid and balanced configuration between social priorities and economic performance (Vanhercke, Sabato et al. 2018). If the idealized conception of “Social Union” is to prevail, more equal living and working conditions must be reached at the EU level. To ensure that the goal of greater social cohesion can be realised, social solidarity mechanisms and more redistributive forms of financial support must be fully implemented and pursued.

Despite the unparalleled financial support made available to member-states, national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) must be highly detailed and oriented towards very specific domains like “the digital transition, the energy transition and on stimulating social and inclusive growth benefiting the next generation” (Verdun et al. 2022). This may limit their orientation towards (more) social priorities, partly because the consultation of the so-called “social stakeholders” (social partners, civil society organisations) was limited (Vanhercke and Verdun 2022).

The social reality of Southern European countries illustrates how challenging it is to accommodate deep-rooted social and labour market risks while simultaneously addressing new and demanding social priorities (such as demographic ageing), alongside global, unresolved - and irreversible - trends such as climate change.

Southern European countries, in general, remain less prepared to absorb the impact of the digital economy on employment; to invest widely in new technologies and prepare workers accordingly; and to readapt their welfare systems – characterized by heavily emphasis on pensions and increasingly inefficient healthcare systems - in a more effective manner, among many other pressing internal and external disruptions. Moreover, unlike their Northern European counterparts, social dialogue is weaker and more fragmented, and the design and delivering of policies in an integrated and synergetic manner is uncommon.

Countries such as Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Spain continue to display a mix of enduring weaknesses that not only place them as “laggards”, but also endanger their chances of “catching up” and ultimately becoming full members of the “best performing” groups.

As explained above, unresolved chronical problems persist including, among other obstacles, structural inefficiencies in services and public policies; a lack of adequate financial and human resources to accommodate pressing social demands; and the absence of long-term planning, as well as robust monitoring and accountability practices. Consequently, individuals in Southern European societies continue to face high levels of (in-work) poverty, precarious employment, structural unemployment; a shortage of good-quality jobs; and inefficient active labour market policies. Recognising its centrality within the EU’s social integration project, the fulfilment of social and labour rights remains an “unfinished adventure” (Bauman 2004).

In 2020, the Indian writer Arundahati Roy refered to the virus as a “portal, a gateway between one world and the next”. Although the idea of transitioning into a new era seems inspiring, the weight of structural problems and asymmetries inside the EU remains evident.

Reimagining a “European Social Union” continues to be a collective endeavour that, for now, still lacks substantive reflection and concrete action.

REFERENCES
 
Almeida, F. and J. D. Santos (2020). "The effects of COVID-19 on job security and unemployment in Portugal." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 40(9/10): 995-1003.
Armingeon, K., C. de la Porte, E. Heins and S. Sacchi (2022). "Voices from the past: economic and political vulnerabilities in the making of next generation EU." Comparative European Politics 20: 144-165.
Aubert, C., H.-A. Dang and M.-H. Nguyen (2022) "The Unequal Impact of the COVID Pandemic: Theory and Evidence on Health and Economic Outcomes for Different Income Groups." IZA Discussion Paper Series.
Bambra, C., R. Riordan, J. Ford and F. Matthews (2020). "The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities." Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 74(11): 964-968.
Baptista, I., E. Marlier, S. Spasova, R. Penã-CAsa, B. Fronteddy, D. Ghailani, S. Sabato and P. Regazzoni (2021). ESPN Social protection and inclusion policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis. E. S. P. Network. Brussels, European Commission.
Bauman, Z. (2004). Europe: An Unfinished Adventure. Cambridge&Malden, Polity Press.
Béland, D., B. Cantillon, R. Hick and A. Moreira (2021). "Social Policy in the face of a global pandemic: Policy responses to the Covid-19 crisis." Social Policy & Administration 55: 249-260.
Béland, D., A. J. He and M. Ramesh (2022). "COVID-19, crisis responses, and public policies: from the persistence of inequalities to the importance of policy design." Policy and Society.
de la Porte, C. and M. D. Jensen (2021). "The next generation EU: An analysis of the dimensions of conflict behind the deal." Social Policy & Administration 55(2): 388-402.
De la Porte, C. and I. Madama (2022). Researching social Europe on the move. Social Policy in Changing European Societies. K. Nelson, R. Nieuwenhuis and M. A. e. Yerkes. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing.
Deakin, S. (2017). What follows austerity? From social pillar to new deal. A European Social Union after the Crisis. F. Vandenbroucke, C. Barnard and G. e. De Baere. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 192-210.
Dodds, K., V. Broto, K. Detterbeck, M. Jones, V. Mamadouh, M. Ramutsindela, M. Varsanyi, D. Wachsmuth and C. Y. Woon (2020). "The Covid-19 pandemic: territorial, political and governance dimensions of the crisis." Territory, Politics, Governance 8(3): 289-298.
Ebbinghaus, B. and L. Lehner (2022). "Cui bono – business or labour? Job retention policies during the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe." Transfer: European Review of Labour 28(1): 47-64.
Eurofound (2020). COVID-19: Policy responses across Europe. Publications Office of the European Union. Luxembourg.
Eurofound (2022). Recovery from COVID-19: The changing structure of employment in the EU. Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union.
Eurostat (2021). Key Figures on Europe - 2021 Edition. Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union.
Ferrera, M. (1996). "The Southern model of welfare in social Europe." Journal of European social policy 6(1): 17-37.
Ferrera, M. (2018). The European Social Union: how to piece it together. Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2018. B. Vanhercke, D. Ghailani and S. e. Sabato. Brussels, OSE&ETUI: 17-30.
Ferrera, M. (2019). "Towards a European Social Union. The European Pillar of Social Rights and the Roadmap for a fully-fledged Social Union". A Forum debate. Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino.
Ferrera, M., Miró, J., & Ronchi, S. (2021). "Walking the road together? EU polity maintenance during the COVID-19 crisis." West European Politics, 44(5/6), 1329–1352.
González, P. and A. Figueiredo (2015). The European social model in a context of crisis and austerity in Portugal. The European Social Model in Crisis, Edward Elgar Publishing: 386-450.
Guillén, A. M., M. León and E. Pavolini (2022). "Are ‘carrots’ better than ‘sticks’? New EU conditionality and social investment policies in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy and Spain." Comparative European Politics 20(2): 220-237.
Jestl, S. and R. Stehrer (2021). "(Post-) pandemic Employment Dynamics in a Comparative Perspective." ETUI Research Paper-Policy brief.
Ladi, S. and D. Tsarouhas (2020). "EU economic governance and Covid-19: policy learning and windows of opportunity." Journal of European Integration 42(8): 1041-1056.
Matsaganis, M., E. Ozdemir, T. Ward and A. Zvakou (2016). Non-standard employment and access to social security benefits. Research note 8/2015. Brussels, European Commission.
Monnet, J. (2015). Memoirs: Jean Monnet, Profile Books.
Moreira, A., Á. Domínguez, C. Antunes, M. Karamessini, M. Raitano and M. Glatzer (2015). "Austerity-driven labour market reforms in southern Europe: Eroding the security of labour market insiders." European Journal of Social Security 17(2): 202-225.
Moreira, A. and R. Hick (2021). "COVID-19, the Great Recession and social policy: Is this time different?" Social Policy & Administration 55(2): 261-279.
Moreira, A., M. Léon, F. C. Moscarola and A. Roumpakis (2020). "In the eye of the storm…again! Social policy responses to COVID-19 in Southern Europe." Social Policy & Administration 55(2): 339-357.
Myant, M. (2021). The economic and social consequences of Covid-19. Social policy in the European Union. State of play 2020. B. Vanhercke, S. Spasova and B. e. Fronteddu. Brussels, OSE&ETUI: 53-69.
Natali, M. and M. Jessoula (2022). The Southern European welfare model. De Gruyter Handbook of Contemporary Welfare States. B. e. Greve. Berlin, Boston, De Gruyter: 101-118.
Pereirinha, J. A. and E. Pereira (2021). "Social resilience and welfare systems under COVID-19: A European comparative perspective." Global Social Policy 21(3): 1-26.
Petmesidou, M. (1996). "Social protection in Southern Europe: trends and prospects." Journal of Area Studies 4(9): 95-125.
Petmesidou, M. (2018). Southern Europe. Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State. B. e. Greve. Oxon&New York, Routledge: 162-175.
Rhodes, M. (1996). "Southern European welfare states: identity, problems and prospects for reform." South European Society and Politics 1(3): 1-22.
Rubery, J. and I. Tavora (2021). The Covid.19 crisis and gender equality: risks and opportunities. Social Policy in the European Union: state of play 2020. B. Vanhercke, S. Spasova and B. e. Fronteddu. Brussels, Ose&ETUI: 71-96.
Suárez-Grimalt, L., A. Coco-Prieto and M. Simó-Solsona (2022). Double inivisibility: the effecfs of hidden unemployment on vulnerable populations in southern European countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. RES. Revista Española de Sociología 31(4).
Valadas, C. (2021). New directions for European Union social policy in challenging times. Social Policy Review 33: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy, 2021. M. Pomati, A. Jolly and J. e. Rees. Bristol, Bristol University Press: 29-48.
Valadas, C. (2022). The activation of employment policy in Southern Europe. The case of Portugal and the translation of external pressures into policies and processes. Social Welfare Issues in Southern Europe. M. Brown and M. e. Briguglio. London, Routledge: 59-77.
Vandenbroucke, F. (2013). "European Social Union: a political necessity and an urgent research programme." Journal for a Progressive Economy 1.
Vandenbroucke, F. and B. Vanhercke (2014). A European Social Union: 10 tough nuts to crack. Background report for the Friends of Europe High-Level Group om Social Union. Brussels, Friends of Europe.
Vanhercke, B., S. Sabato and D. Ghailani (2018). The European Pillar of Social Rights as a game changer. Social Policy in the European Union: state of the play Brussels, European Trade Union Institute and European Social Observatory.
Vanhercke, B. and A. Verdun (2022). Will European Recovery ever be co-determined by social actors? National Recovery and Resilience Plans. Social Europe Dossier, Social Europe&Hans Bockler Stiftung: 27-331.
Verdun, A., B. Vanhercke and S. Spasova (2022). "Are (some) social players entering European recovery through the Semester back door?" Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2021: 107-130.

​download PDF
​número 06 // dezembro 2025

no. 06 // dezembro 2025

Artigo

download PDF

FUNDAÇÃO RES PUBLICA
A Fundação Res Publica é uma instituição dedicada ao pensamento político e às políticas públicas. À luz dos seus estatutos, inspira-se nos valores e princípios da liberdade, da igualdade, da justiça, da fraternidade, da dignidade e dos direitos humanos.


​
​fundacaorespublica.pt

​1. For a discussion on the differences in the design and implementation of short-time work as a policy tool, see Ebbinghaus and Lehner (2022).







2. The Recovery and Resilience Facility was designed as a temporary recovery instrument to to mitigate the social and economic impact of the pandemic. It made available €723.8 billion (in current prices) in loans (€385.8 billion) and grants (€338 billion). The recovery and resilience plans that each Member State submits to the Commission under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should address the challenges identified in the 2019 and 2020 country-specific recommendations by the European Commission.

3. For a literature review on the Southern European welfare regime see Natali and Jessoula (2022).

































4. Reporting on the Portuguese case, González and Figueiredo (2015) underline the constraints of the Portuguese economy throughout the last decade and explain how the sustainability of the European Social Model” was already in danger before (though the situation aggravated afterwards) the 2007-8 crisis.













































































​
5. The EPSR social scoreboard indicators are examined in terms of their relevance to monitor social progress in Europe and a basis for a new proposal are exaplained in an ETUI recent publication entitled “The Social scoreboard revisited”. Available at: https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2017.03%20Background%20analysis%20Social%20Scoreboard%20Web%20version.pdf. (Consulted on November, 9th 2022).

6. In a recent publication, Guillen et al. (2022) adopt a more optimist tone, arguing that, in the case of Italy and Spain, the RRPs social policy “is mostly framed within a social investment approach and strategy”, with a more considerable share of the budget allocated to welfare issues and education.